We study financial networks with debt contracts and credit default swaps between specific pairs of banks. Given such a financial system, we want to decide which of the banks are in default, and how much of their liabilities these defaulting banks can pay. There can easily be multiple different solutions to this problem, leading to a situation of default ambiguity and a range of possible solutions to implement for a financial authority.
Introduction
Financial systems are often called "highly complex", suggesting that relations and contracts between different financial institutions such as banks form a networked system that is basically impossible to understand. However, computer science has developed a comprehensive methodology to quantify the complexity of such problems. This classification has a range of problems that are known to be hard to solve, and it also has problems that are even worse in the sense that they are even hard to reasonably approximate.
At the core of understanding financial systems is the so-called clearing problem: given a system of banks with (conditional or unconditional) debt contracts between specific banks, we need to decide which of the banks are in default due to these debts, and how much of their liabilities can these defaulting banks pay. This is a fundamental problem in a financial system, and an essential task for a financial regulator after a shock, with the 2008 financial crisis as a recent example. Our main goal in this paper is to understand the computational complexity of the clearing problem.
Earlier results have shown that clearing a financial system is computationally straightforward if all the contracts between the banks are unconditional debts. More generally, clearing is solvable if the contracts in the network represent so-called "long" positions, i.e., a better outcome for one bank ensures a better (or the same) outcome for every other bank.
However, this is not always the case in real-world financial systems: in practice, banks often have "short" positions on each other, i.e. it can be more favorable for a bank if another bank is in a worse situation. Typical short positions are credit default swaps (CDSs), short-selling options, and other types of derivatives.
This suggests that a realistic analysis of financial systems requires a model that can capture both long and short positions. However, with both short and long positions in the network, financial systems suddenly exhibit significantly richer behavior. In particular, we can easily have situations of default ambiguity when there are multiple (possibly a high number of) solutions in the system, and none of these solutions is obviously superior to the others in terms of clearing.
In practice, a clearing authority has to make a choice among these different possible solutions of the system, yielding an outcome that is more favorable to some banks and less favorable to others. In this paper, we focus on such cases of default ambiguity, and analyze a range of different criteria for the clearing authority to evaluate the available solutions and select one of them to implement. Our main result is negative, showing that even if the solution set of a system can be easily characterized, and the financial regulator has a clear objective function to select among these solutions, it is still computationally hard to find the best solution of the financial system, or even to approximate it to any reasonable (e.g. constant or polylogarithmic) factor.
Our contributions begin with some observations about the solution space of financial systems, regarding the possible number of solutions and their Pareto-optimality. We then discuss a wide range of problems, each of which is about finding the best solution in a financial system according to a specific objective function. These problems include finding the solution • with the smallest number of defaulting banks,
• with the smallest amount of total unpaid debt,
• which is preferred by the largest number of banks,
• which is the most favorable one for a specific bank,
• which has the most balanced distribution of equity for specific banks, and many others. Our main contribution is showing that all these problems are not only NP-hard to solve, but also NP-hard to approximate to any n 1/2−ǫ factor for some of these problems, and to any n 1/4−ǫ factor for others (for any ǫ > 0). This shows that even if the clearing authority has a well-defined objective function, finding a reasonably good solution is still computationally intractable.
Finally, Section 6 shows that our hardness results also hold in slightly different variants of the model, e.g. with default costs, bounded edge weights or heavily restricted short positions.
Related Work
One of the most fundamental financial system models is the one introduced by Eisenberg and Noe [7] , which only assumes simple debt contracts between banks. Following works have also extended this model by default costs [18] , cross-ownership relations [8, 21] or so-called covered CDSs [16] . However, these model variants can only describe long positions in a network. This means that there is always a solution that is simultaneously the best for every bank, and thus the clearing problem is not particularly interesting in this setting.
In contrast to this, the recent work of Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston [19, 20] introduced a model which also allows CDSs in the network, i.e. debt contracts where the payment obligation depends on the default of a specific other bank. While a CDS is still a very simple financial contract, it already allows us to capture short positions in the network. Moreover, CDSs are a prominent kind of derivative in real-world financial systems that also played a major role in the 2008 financial crisis [10] .
We use this recent model of Schuldenzucker et. al. as the base model for our findings. With both debt contracts and CDSs in the network, the clearing problem suddenly becomes significantly more challenging. The work of [19, 20] mostly focuses on the existence of a solution in this model, and the computational complexity of finding an arbitrary solution; we summarize these results in Section 4. The authors also discuss a set of strong restrictions to the system that ensure the existence of a maximal solution, i.e. one that is simultaneously the best for all banks in the system. However, in the general case, such a maximal solution does not exist, and thus the clearing authority has to select from a set of solutions that represents a trade-off between the interests of different banks. The work of [19, 20] does not analyze this situation, describing it as unwanted since it is prone to the lobbying activity of banks in the system, trying to influence the authority to select a solution that is beneficial to them. Our work aims to analyze the clearing problem in this general case; to our knowledge, the problem has not been studied from this perspective before.
In general, the propagation of shocks in a network has been studied in many slightly different variants of these models [1, 3, 9] . Other works introduced more substantial changes to these models, e.g. time-dependent clearing mechanisms [2] or game-theoretic aspects [4] .
There are also various approaches to develop some measure of the complexity or sensitivity of a financial networks, often through classical graph-theoretic concepts [3, 11] . To our knowledge, besides [19, 20] , the only result that specifically discusses computational complexity in this context is the work of [15] in the model of [8] , showing that among the shocks of a given total size, it is computationally hard to find the one that is most damaging to the system altogether.
There is also a wide literature on different kinds of financial derivatives; CDSs in particular have been studied extensively in [6, 10, 17] . On the more practical side, the clearing problem also plays a central role when executing stress tests to evaluate the sensitivity of financial systems, e.g. in the European Central Bank's stress test framework [5] .
3 Model definition 3 
.1 Banks and contracts
A financial system consists of a set of banks B. Individual banks are usually denoted by u, v or w, the number of banks by n = |B|. Each bank v has a certain amount of external assets available to the bank, denoted by e v .
We assume that there are contracts for payments between given pairs of banks in the system. Each such contract is between two specific banks u and v, and obliges u (the debtor) to pay a specific amount of money (known as the notional) to the other bank v (the creditor), either unconditionally or based on a specific condition (to be discussed later). We assume that any initial payments that resulted in these contracts (e.g. bank v lending a given amount of money to u in the past which results in a debt from u to v in the present) are already implicitly represented in the external assets of the banks. Hence the external assets and the contracts together contain all the necessary information to analyze the current state of the system.
The contracts altogether result in a specific amount of payment obligations for each bank v. If v cannot fulfill these obligations, then we say that v is in default. In this case, the recovery rate of v, denoted by r v , is the portion of liabilities that v is able to pay. This shows that we always have r v ∈ [0, 1], and v is in default exactly if r v < 1. For the special case when v is not able to pay at all, i.e. r v = 0, we say that v is in complete default.
The model allows two kinds of contracts between banks. Debt contracts (or simply debts) oblige bank u to pay a specific amount to bank v unconditionally, i.e. in any case. On the other hand, we also allows credit default swaps (CDSs) between u and v in reference to a third bank w. A CDS represents a conditional debt that obliges u to pay a specific amount to v only in case if bank w is in default. More specifically, if the notional of the CDS is δ and the recovery rate of bank w is r w , then the CDS incurs a payment obligation of δ · (1 − r w ) from node u to v.
In practice, banks can have many possible motivations to enter into CDSs with each other. CDSs can be used as an insurance policy in case of the default of one of the debtors of the bank to mitigate risks, or they can be placed due to speculations based on insights regarding the market.
While real-world financial systems also have various other kinds of contracts between banks, debts and CDSs already allow us to model the two basic kinds of relations in a financial network. A debt contract from u to v can express a long position of v on u: if u has a larger recovery rate, then it is able to pay a larger portion of its debt to v. On the other hand, v being the creditor of a CDS in reference to w can express a short position of v on w: if w has a smaller recovery rate, then v receives more payment from this CDS.
Before a formal definition, consider a simple example financial system in Figure 1 . In this system, bank u has a total liability of 4 due to the 2 outgoing debts, but it only has 2 external assets; hence it is in default, an its recovery rate is r u = 1 2 . The model assumes that in this case, it makes payments proportionally to the respective liabilities in the contracts; thus it transfers 1 unit of money to w and 1 unit to v.
Since u has a recovery rate of r u = 1 2 , the CDS from w to v translates to a liability of 2·(1−r u ) = 1 unit of money. Although w has no external assets, it receives 1 unit of money from u as discussed before, so it can fulfill this payment obligation and narrowly avoids default, hence r w = 1.
Finally, v has no liabilities at all, so r v = 1. Since it receives 1 unit of money from both u and w, and has e v = 1, v has 3 units of money after the clearing of the system. Figure 1: Example financial system, with a consistent notation to that of [19] . External assets are shown in rectangles besides the banks. Simple debts are shown as blue arrows, while CDSs are shown as orange arrows with a dotted line to the reference bank.
Assets and liabilities
The systems described above can be compactly represented in a few matrices and vectors. The external assets of banks can be represented as a vector e = (e v ) v∈B , the notionals of debts between banks as a matrix D = (δ u,v ) u,v∈B , with δ u,v denoting the notional of debt from u to v (interpreted as δ u,v = 0 if there is no such debt). Finally, the CDSs in the system form a 3-dimensional matrix C = (δ w u,v ) u,v,w∈B , with δ w u,v denoting the notional of the CDS from u to v with reference to w. In line with previous work, we always assume that no bank enters into either a contract with itself or in reference to itself. Thus given a financial system on B by (e, D, C), we are interested in the recovery rates r v of banks in the system, which can also be represented as a vector r = (r v ) v∈B .
Given a recovery rate vector r, the liability of u to v is formally defined as
The total liability of bank u is then l u (r) = v∈B l u,v (r), i.e. the sum of payment obligations for u. However, the actual payment from u to v can be lower than l u,v (r) if u is in default. The model assumes that defaulting banks always use all their assets to pay for liabilities, and they make payments proportionally to the respective liabilities. Hence with a recovery rate of r u , u is able to pay an r u portion of each liability, so the payment from u to v is p u,v (r) = r u · l u,v (r). On the other hand, the assets of v are defined as
Given the assets and liabilities of bank v, the recovery rate r v has to satisfy
If a vector r is an equilibrium point of these equations, i.e. it satisfies this condition on a v (r) and l v (r) for every bank v, then r is a clearing vector of the system. Our main goal in the paper is to analyze the different clearing vectors.
We also define the equity of node v in a solution as
i.e. the amount of funds available to v after clearing. We assume that the main goal of banks is to maximize their equity. In the example system of Figure 1 , the equities of banks in the only solution of the system are q u = 0, q w = 0 and q v = 3.
Note that we have written q u instead of q u (r) in order to simplify notation; we often do not show the dependence on r when r is clear from the context. However, recall that assets, liabilities and equities are always in fact a function of r.
In the rest of the paper, we use mathematical terminology to discuss the systems. We refer to the banks in the system as nodes, and the clearing vectors as solutions, with the set of solutions denoted by S. The notionals of debts and CDSs are called the weight of the contracts.
Systems with loss
Besides the described model of financial systems, the work of [19, 20] also studies a more general variant which also assumes default costs, based on an earlier model introduced by [18] . In this generalized variant, systems have two further global parameters α, β ∈ [0, 1]. The model assumes that when a bank is in default, it loses a specific fraction of its assets; more specifically, it only has access to an α portion of its external assets and a β portion of its incoming payments. Thus if v is in default, its assets are defined as
This sudden drop in assets results in financial systems with significantly different properties [19, 20] .
Our original model is obtained for α = β = 1. We also refer to these original systems as systems without loss, while systems with α < 1 or β < 1 are called systems with loss.
The introduction of default costs into the systems does not affect the main ideas of our constructions. For ease of presentation, we focus on financial systems without loss throughout the paper, i.e. we assume α = β = 1 unless specified otherwise. Section 6.1 discusses the minor modifications required to adapt our proofs to the case of systems with loss.
Terminology from graph theory
We prove our hardness results by reductions from graph theoretic problems. In these underlying problems, we study simple, unweighted, undirected graphs G, with their node set and edge set denoted by V and E, respectively. We use N = |V | to denote the number of nodes in such graphs. We use z to denote the nodes of G (somewhat irregularly), in order to avoid confusion with the nodes of the financial system. For a given node z, let N G (z) denote the set of neighbors of z.
Given a graph G on a set of nodes V , we say that a set of
We use two well-known graph-theoretic problems as the basis of our reduction. Given a graph G, the goal of the maximum independent set problem (MaxIS) is to find an independent set of maximum size in the graph, i.e. an independent set V 0 such that |V 0 | is as high as possible. The goal of the minimum independent dominating set problem (MinIDS) is to find a set V 0 which is both independent and dominating, with |V 0 | as small as possible. We note that any maximal independent set in G is both an independent set and an independent dominating set, so both of these problems have a valid solution in any nonempty graph G. It is known that both MaxIS and MinIDS are not only NP-hard to solve, but also NP-hard to approximate to a factor of N 1−ǫ for any ǫ > 0 [13, 14] .
Properties of the solution space
The previous work of Schuldenzucker et. al. mostly focuses on the existence and computability of solutions in financial systems [19, 20] . Their main results can be summarized as follows:
• Loss-free systems: in this case, there always exists a solution. However, the proof of this is non-constructive; finding an (approximate) solution is still computationally hard.
• Systems with loss: in this case, a solution might not exists at all. Deciding if a system has an (approximate) solution is an NP-hard problem.
Once we know that a solution exists, another natural question is if there is a solution that is clearly better than all others, i.e. it is the primary preference of every node. More formally, we say that a solution r is maximal if q v (r) ≥ q v (r ′ ) for every node v and every solution r ′ . If such a maximal solution exists, then even though there may be other solutions, we can assume that a clearing authority always prefers to implement this maximal solution.
However, Schuldenzucker et. al. also show that in both settings, a system can have multiple solutions with none of them being maximal in the general case. This implies that the solutions describe a trade-off between the interests of different nodes. Our paper analyzes a wide range of objective functions that a reasonable authority could apply in this case.
A basic building block: the branching gadget
We begin with our most basic tool, the branching gadget. This gadget has already been widely used (with some parametrizations) in the works of [19] and [20] , e.g. as a simple example of a system with no maximal solution. As shown in Figure 2 , the gadget consists of two nodes x and y, both having an outgoing debt to a sink node t and an incoming CDS from a source s. For the weight of the two CDSs, denoted by δ x and δ y , we always assume δ x ≥ δ y ≥ 1.
Note that the source and sink nodes can never go into default, so for simplicity, we only analyze the recovery rate subvector (r x , r y ). First, observe that we cannot have both nodes surviving, i.e.
(1, 1) as a solution: both nodes only receive any funds if the other node is in default. However, if one of the nodes is in complete default, then the other can already pay its debt, thus (0, 1) and (1, 0) are always solutions in this system. Besides (0, 1) and (1, 0), there may be other solutions when both nodes are in default with a positive recovery rate; these depend on the concrete values of δ x and δ y . If x and y are in default, then their assets are equal to the amount of outgoing debt that they are able to pay. Hence, the remaining solutions of the system can be obtained from the equations
However, there are also choices of δ x , δ y for which the equations confirm that (0, 1) and (1, 0) are indeed the only two solutions. One such example is when δ x = 2, δ y = 1; we refer to this special case as the clean branching gadget. This gadget has the useful property of representing a binary choice: r x can only take a value of 0 or 1, and r y offers a convenient representation of its negation. The gadget was already used in [20] , and it is also a crucial tool in our reductions. For convenience, we say that the gadget is active in a solution if it is in state (1, 0), and not active otherwise. 
Number of solutions
Using the branching gadget, we can now discuss some straightforward properties of the solution space of financial systems. We first show that a number of solutions might be very large.
Observation 1. There exists a financial system with infinitely many solutions.
Proof. Consider the branching gadget of Figure 2 with δ x = δ y = 1. For any ρ ∈ [0, 1], the vector (ρ, 1−ρ) satisfies the equations above, thus it is a solution of the system.
While this shows that the number of solutions is potentially unlimited, the difference between these vectors is not significant: both x and y are in default for every ρ ∈ (0, 1), and the solutions only differ in the extent of their default. It is natural to ask if we can also have a large number of solutions that differ in the subset of nodes that are actually in default. We say that two solutions r and r ′ are essentially different if there exists a node v such that either
Since we only consider a boolean value for each node in this definition, the number of pairwise essentially different solutions is at most 2 n in any system. Observation 2. There exists a system with 2 Ω(n) solutions that are pairwise essentially different.
Proof. Let us create a system with n 4 copies of the clean branching gadget, which are all independent from each other. In each such gadget, there are two possible subsolutions: (0,1) or (1, 0) . Over the distinct gadgets, these can be combined in any different way, which adds up to 2 n/4 solutions that are all pairwise essentially different.
Strictly better and worse solutions
While financial system may not always contain a maximal solution, it is still reasonable to say that some specific solutions are definitely better than others. Definition 3. Given two solutions r and r ′ , we say that r ′ is strictly better than r (or r is strictly worse than r ′ ) if q v (r ′ ) ≥ q v (r) for every node v, and there exists a node u such that q u (r ′ ) > q u (r). A solution r is Pareto-optimal if there is no solution r ′ that is strictly better than r (otherwise, r is Pareto-suboptimal).
A clearing authority may want to avoid implementing Pareto-suboptimal solutions, and prefer a strictly better solution instead. However, selecting among Pareto-optimal solutions is a more difficult question, since it represents a trade-off between the preferences of different nodes. Note that a solution is maximal if and only if it is the only Pareto-optimal solution of the system. Proof. We show that in every solution, v∈B q v = v∈B e v . Since v∈B e v is a fixed parameter of the input problem, this already proves the statement.
Recall that in a given solution, p v = u∈B p v,u and a v = e v + u∈B p u,v denotes the payments and assets of node v, respectively. Furthermore, the equity of v is always q v = a v − p v , regardless of v being in default or not. This implies
However, when we have default costs in the system, then some funds are lost when a node goes into default, and thus this property does not hold anymore.
Lemma 5. In systems with loss, there can be solutions that are Pareto-suboptimal.
Proof. Let β = 1 2 , α ∈ (0, 1), and consider the branching gadget with δ x = δ y = 3 2 . To avoid confusion, let us now assume that e s = 3 instead of infinity. We express the recovery rate and equity vectors in the gadget by (r s , r x , r y , r t ) and (q s , q x , q y , q t ) for simplicity.
The vectors (1, 0, 1, 1) are (1, 1, 0, 1) are still solutions of this system; these induce equity vectors of ( 3 2 , 0, 1 2 , 1) and ( 3 2 , 1 2 , 0, 1), respectively. Any other solution must satisfy r x = 3 2 · β · (1 − r y ) and r y = 3 2 · β · (1 − r x ). Solving these equations, we get that the third solution is (1, 3 7 , 3 7 , 1), resulting in an equity vector of ( 9 7 , 0, 0, 6 7 ). This third solution is strictly worse than the other two.
Finding the 'best' solution
In this section, we discuss a wide range of different objectives that the clearing authority could realistically follow when selecting a solution in the system. Our main result is showing that in all these cases, the optimal solution is not only hard to find, but also hard to reasonably approximate. We begin with a brief overview of the gadgets we use in our proofs.
Tools and gadgets
Branching gadget One of our most basic tools is the branching gadget of Section 4.1. In the following, we always use clean branching gadgets (with δ x = 2, δ y = 1) unless specified otherwise.
Recall that this gadget represents a binary choice by ensuring that in each solution, (r x , r y ) is either (0, 1) or (1, 0). For the analysis, it is a convenient property that the output nodes x and y have a clearing rate of either 0 or 1 in each solution. Generally, we say that a node v is a binary node if the construction ensures this property, i.e. that r v ∈ {0, 1} in any solution of the system.
Cutoff gadget Another useful tool is the cutoff gadget introduced in the work of [20] . The gadget takes an input node v, and transforms it into a binary node w if r v / ∈ (η 1 , η 2 ).
Lemma 6 (from [20] ). Given an input node v and arbitrary constants 0 < η 1 < η 2 < 1, there exists a gadget with an output node w having the following property: Boolean operations The development of some straightforward gadgets enables us to simulate boolean operations on nodes, and hence represent complex logical or combinatorial relations. Note that some of these gadgets (specifically, the not gadget, and a nand gate which is used as tool for our or gadget) have been introduced before in the work of [19, 20] . Figure 3 shows the notation of these logical gates and the cutoff gadgets in our figures. Lemma 7. Given binary nodes u and v, we can construct the following gadgets:
• an or gate, i.e. a node w such that r w = 0 if r u = r v = 0, and r w = 1 otherwise,
• an and gate, i.e. a node w such that r w = 1 if r u = r v = 1, and r w = 0 otherwise.
Proof. For negation, consider Figure 4 . If r v = 0, then w receives 1 unit of money, and it can pay its debt entirely. However, if r v = 1, then w has no assets at all, and thus r w = 0.
The or relation is shown in Figure 5 ; it already uses the previously described not gadget. If r u or r v is 1, then at least one of the connected not gadgets is in default, and thus w has assets of at least 1; this already implies r w = 1. Otherwise w has no assets at all, and hence r w = 0.
The and relation is illustrated in Figure 6 . If at most one of r u and r v is 1, then w 0 receives a payment in at most one of the two CDSs. Therefore, w 0 has at most 1 assets, thus r w 0 ≤ 1 2 . Since the connected cutoff gadget has η 1 = 0.7, we have r w = 0 in this case. On the other hand, if r u = r v = 1, then r w 0 = 1, and r w = 1 follows.
In a very similar fashion, we can also create gadgets that express the and and or relations of multiple inputs. Note that all of these gadgets only use the input nodes v 1 and v 2 as reference entities for CDSs, and thus inserting such gadgets has no effect on the behavior of the input nodes.
Source and sink nodes For a specific node v in our constructions, we often need to add a debt/CDS going into node v or coming out from v. The aim of these debts is to establish a certain behavior for v, and thus it is unimportant where this contract comes from or goes to.
For a simpler presentation, we add a specific source node s to our constructions, which is the source of all such incoming debts/CDSs, and a specific sink node t, which is the recipient of all such outgoing debts/CDSs. The source node s has e s = ∞, so these incoming debts are always paid (depending on the reference entity, of course, in case of a CDS).
An example problem: maximizing the equity of a node
To demonstrate the ideas behind our constructions, we first discuss the problem of maximizing the equity of a given node. That is, given a node v, we define the value of each solution r as the equity q v , and we denote the search problem of finding the highest-value solution by MaxEquity(v).
Note that this is a very natural problem when analyzing the solution space. If a bank has any influence over the clearing authority, or if it simply wants to analyze its situation in the system, finding the best possible outcome for the bank is crucial. However, we show that even for a single bank, it is already hard to compute, or even approximate the best outcome among the possible solutions of the system. Theorem 8. The problem Max Equity(v) is NP-hard to approximate to any n 1/2−ǫ factor. Proof. We show the claim through a reduction to the MaxIS problem, which is inapproximable to any N 1−ǫ factor [14] . Assume that we are given a graph G on N nodes as an input to MaxIS. To transform G into a financial system representation, we begin by creating N distinct branching gadgets. Each gadget corresponds to a specific node z of G: the fact whether the branching gadget is active or not indicates if z is contained in the given independent set.
Besides the branching gadgets, we add a further node v with e v = 0. For each node z of G (i.e. each branching gadget), we add a CDS of value 1 from the source s to v, in reference to node y of the branching gadget of z. If the branching gadget is active in a solution, then this y is in complete default, and thus s pays 1 unit to v. This way, the total assets of v is exactly the number of active branching gadgets in the system, i.e. the size of the selected node set in G in our solution.
It remains to ensure that the chosen set of nodes is independent. For each edge (z 1 , z 2 ) in G, we consider the branching gadgets of z 1 and z 2 , and insert an and gate on the nodes x of these branching gadgets as inputs, as shown in Figure 7 . We negate the output of this and gate in an indicator node w z 1 ,z 2 . We then take the nodes w z 1 ,z 2 for all edges (z 1 , z 2 ), and combine them with a multi-input and gate in a final node v c which indicates the correctness of the solution (i.e. if our set is independent). Finally, we add an outgoing CDS of weight ∞ from v in reference to v c , as shown in Figure 8 .
If the branching gadgets of z 1 and z 2 are both active in a solution, then w z 1 ,z 2 is in complete default, and thus v c is also in complete default. As a result, v has an infinitely large debt to the sink, and thus q v = 0. Hence in any reasonable solution, no two neighboring nodes can have active branching gadgets. If we get a solution that violates this constraint, we can simply replace it by a solution where exactly one branching gadget is active, and thus q v = 1.
Note that this step of excluding unreasonably weak solutions is a regular practice in such reductions: if the approximation algorithm of MaxEquity(v) returns an unreasonably bad solution, we can replace this by a trivial better solution for simplicity. Our transformation (from MaxEquity(v) to MaxIS) keeps the ratio between the given solution and the optimum unchanged, so starting from a better MaxEquity(v) solution leads to an even larger independent set, showing a stronger claim. Thus we can simply assume that solutions violating the constraints are never returned.
Since the equity of v is equal to the size of the corresponding independent set in G in any solution (including the optimum), the reduction follows straightforwardly. Assume we have a polynomial-time N 1−ǫ factor approximation algorithm to MaxEquity(v). Then given any graph ... Figure 7 : Gadget for a pair of neighboring nodes z 1 and z 2 , in order to verify independence G, we can simply transform it into the system above, and use the algorithm to obtain a solution of MaxEquity(v). Since the node sets corresponding to both our solution and the optimum have the same value in the MaxIS problem, this also provides an N 1−ǫ factor approximation of MaxIS.
As the system consists of n = O(N 2 ) nodes, this shows an inapproximability to any n 1/2−ǫ factor in terms of n. That is, an n 1/2−ǫ approximation is also guaranteed to fall within a ratio of O(N 1−2ǫ ), which is asymptotically smaller than N 1−ǫ ′ for an appropriate ǫ ′ > 0. However, no N 1−ǫ ′ factor approximation of MaxIS is possible unless P=NP.
Note that once the state (i.e. activation or non-activation) of each branching gadget is decided, this already determines the recovery rate of all nodes in this system. Thus the solutions of the system are exactly the 2 N solutions that correspond to the different node sets of G. Therefore, the source if this computational hardness is not the fact that we cannot even find a single solution, as described in [20] . Even though the solution space of the system can be completely characterized, finding (or approximating) the best solution is still NP-hard.
The dual problem: minimizing equity
We also discuss the problem of finding a solution that minimizes the equity of v, denoted by MinEquity(v). While its practical relevance is smaller, this problem allows us to illustrate how the same technique can be used in case of minimization problems.
The main idea of the construction remains very similar, even though the reduction is based on a different underlying problem. Recall that MinIDS is also NP-hard to approximate to any N 1−ǫ factor [13] . Thus given an input graph G, we can again create a branching gadget for each node z of G in order to indicate whether z is contained in the selected set. As before, we use an and gate for each edge (z 1 , z 2 ) in G to ensure independence. Furthermore, for any node z 1 and its neighborhood N G (z 1 ), we add an or gadget to ensure that at least one of the nodes in z 1 ∪ N G (z 1 ) is included in the set, and thus the set is indeed dominating. Our constraint indicator node v c is again obtained as the and relation of all these nodes, as shown in Figure 9 .
We now have a minimization problem, so we need to ensure that if a constraint is violated, then q v becomes unreasonably large. Instead of adding a CDS from v to t, we now achieve this by adding a CDS from s to v, again with weight of ∞ and it in reference to the constraint indicator node v c (see Figure 10 ). If a solution does not corresponds to an independent dominating set, then this makes the equity of v infinitely large. Note that there always exists a solution of finite value, since any maximal independent set in G provides an independent dominating set of size at most N .
...
other independence and domination constraints
x in branching gadgets of the neighbors of z 1 Figure 9 : Further constraint gadgets in the MinIDS problem to verify domination As in the maximization case, v receives 1 unit of money for each active branching gadget, so the equity of v equals the number of nodes in the chosen independent dominating set.
Corollary 9. The problem MinEquity(v) is NP-hard to approximate to any n 1/2−ǫ factor.
Most of our proofs follow the same general idea, reducing a problem to either MaxIS or MinIDS. In these reductions, the branching gadgets and the logical gates enforcing the constraints require no changes; there are only two aspects of the reductions that are problem-specific. On the one hand, in each reduction, we have to ensure that if any of the constraints is violated, then the value of the solution becomes unreasonably large/small (depending on whether we are minimizing/maximizing). On the other hand, we need to ensure that the value of any valid solution is proportional to the number of active branching gadgets, at least asymptotically, and thus approximating our problem would indeed allow us to approximate MaxIS/MinIDS.
Global optima for a system
Given a financial system with many solutions, a clearing authority would have to decide which of these solutions to implement. In practice, there can be many different criteria for selecting among the solutions. Some of the most natural objective functions for the authority are as follows:
• MinDefault: minimize the number of defaulting nodes, i.e. minimize |{v ∈ B | r v < 1}|
• MaxPrefer: find the solution that is the primary preference of most nodes, i.e. define the maximal equity of v as q v
• MinUnpaid: minimize the amount of unpaid liabilities, i.e. minimize v∈B l v − p v ,
• MinPropUnpaid: minimize the proportion of unpaid liabilities (compared to the total liabilities present in the system),
The optima for these objectives might be realized in very different solutions, and thus these problems are indeed different. In fact, it is even possible that each optimum is attained in a distinct solution, and each one is significantly better in its respective metric than all other solutions.
Observation 10. Let h be an arbitrarily large number; for convenience, we assume h = ω(n). There exists a financial system with exactly four solutions r 1 , r 2 , r 3 and r 4 , such that:
• in terms of MinDefault, r 1 is an Ω( √ n) factor better than r 2 , r 3 and r 4 ,
• in terms of Max Prefer, r 2 is an Ω( √ n) factor better than r 1 , r 3 and r 4 ,
• in terms of MinUnpaid, r 3 is an Ω(h) factor better than r 1 , r 2 and r 4 ,
• in terms of MinPropUnpaid, r 4 is an Ω(h) factor better than r 1 , r 2 and r 3 .
An example graph with this property is discussed in Appendix A.1.
Unfortunately, for each of these objective functions, we show that it is not only NP-hard to find the best solution in the system, but also to approximate it to any reasonable factor. Theorem 11. The problem MinDefault is NP-hard to approximate to any n 1/4−ǫ factor. Proof. We use the MinIDS problem construction discussed in Section 5.3: we encode the nodes as branching gadgets, and through logical gates, we express in an indicator node v c whether a solution satisfies all constraints.
Furthermore, for each branching gadget (i.e. each node z of G), we add N 3 new nodes u z,i (with i ∈ {1, ..., N 3 }) to the construction. Each such new node has 1 external asset and an outgoing CDS of weight 2, as shown in Figure 11 . These CDSs are in reference to a new node v z , which is obtained as the and relation of v c and node y in the branching gadget of z. Thus, if either the branching gadget for z is active (z is in the chosen set) or one of the constraints is violated, the and relation provides r vz = 0, and thus all the nodes u z,i are in default.
Hence if a solution encodes an independent dominating set of size k, then exactly k · N 3 of the new nodes are in default, i.e. the number of defaulting new nodes is proportional to k. The original part of the construction only consists of O(N 2 ) nodes, so it is asymptotically irrelevant. Thus if a MinDefault algorithm always finds a γ-approximate solution for any N , then this is only possible if it always finds the representation of an independent dominating set that is a γ-approximation of the MinIDS optimum in G. Hence an N 1−ǫ approximation algorithm for MinDefault also yields an N 1−ǫ approximation for MinIDS. Since the system has n = O(N 4 ) nodes, this results in an inapproximability to any n 1/4−ǫ factor.
The task of minimizing the number of defaulting nodes can also be rephrased as maximizing the number of surviving (non-defaulting) nodes, denoted by MaxSurviving. The two problem definitions are clearly identical in terms of the optimal solution. However, as a search problem, MaxSurviving is defined by a different objective function, so the two problems could behave very differently in terms of approximability. This is very similar to the case of the independent set and vertex cover problems in graph theory. Since the complement of an independent set is always a vertex cover, the maximum independent set and minimum vertex cover are realized in the same optimal solution. However, since the metric of the objective function is different for the two problems, the approximability of the two problems is very different: while vertex cover can easily be 2-approximated, it is NP-hard to approximate MaxIS to any n 1−ǫ factor [12, 14] . This is often the case with problems where the value of a structure and its complement sum up to the total size N of the input.
Interestingly, we show that in our case, both metrics are hard to approximate: we also cannot find a reasonably good solution in terms of the number of surviving nodes. Proof. The construction is very similar to that of Theorem 11. Since this is a maximization problem, we now begin with the MaxIS construction of Section 5.2. Once again, for each branching gadget, we add N 3 new nodes u z,i with e u z,i = 1 and an outgoing CDS of weight 2. These CDSs are again in reference to a node v z , but v z is now obtained as the and relation of v c and node x of the branching gadget of z (shown in Figure 12 ). Hence, the nodes u z,i are now in default either if the branching gadget is not active, or if an independence constraint is violated. Figure 12 : Extra nodes u z,i added for MaxSurviving This means that if a solution represents an independent set of size k, then exactly k · N 3 of the newly added nodes survive. Hence the value of the objective function is again (asymptotically) proportional to the size of the chosen independent set, and thus an approximation to MaxSurviving also provides the same factor of approximation for MaxIS.
The same hardness result can be proven for the remaining objective functions in a very similar fashion. An analysis of these reductions is available in Appendix A.2. Furthermore, similarly to the case of MaxSurviving, we can also define a corresponding dual problem for each of these objective functions; these problems are also hard to approximate. 
Most balanced solution
It is also interesting to consider solutions where the distribution of equity is balanced in some sense. E.g. if there are two larger alliances of banks (i.e. sets of nodes) that are owned by the same entity, an authority might be motivated to find a solution that distributes the total equity fairly between these alliances.
We first consider the special case of finding the solution which is the most balanced for two specific nodes. Given nodes v 1 and v 2 , the search problem
is NP-hard to approximate to any n 1/2−ǫ factor.
Proof. Consider our reduction scheme to MinIDS. We add two specific nodes v 1 and v 2 , both starting with 2N assets. For each branching gadget, we add a CDS of value 1 from v 1 to v 2 , with reference to y; thus for each active gadget, v 1 loses and v 2 gains 1 unit of money (see Figure 13 ). If a node set of G consists of k nodes, then the corresponding solution to will have a value of exactly 2k. Therefore, any approximation algorithm to MinDiffEq(v 1 , v 2 ) provides an approximation to MinIDS. With n = O(N 2 ) in the system, this implies inapproximability to any n 1/2−ǫ factor.
If any of the constraints are violated, we create a debt of N from v 1 to v 2 , thus ensuring |q v 1 − q v 2 | ≥ 2N . This makes the solution worse than any maximal independent set in G. This already shows that the more general problem of balancing the total equity of two sets of nodes
is also computationally hard. Another interesting special case of the general problem is when each bank belongs to one of the alliances, i.e. V 1 ∪ V 2 = B. In Appendix A.3, we show that the problem is still hard in this special case.
Some decision problems
Finally, we discuss some further decision problems that could be interesting for a clearing authority. Note that our base constructions can easily be adjusted to the case of decision problems: given a graph G and an integer k, we can consider the original MaxIS construction, and add an outgoing debt of weight k from node v. We then insert a cutoff gadget on v with parameters k−1 k + ǫ 1 and k−1 k + ǫ 2 for some ǫ 1 , ǫ 2 ∈ (0, 1 k ). If v has assets of at most k − 1 altogether, then the indicator node v d of the cutoff gadget has r vd = 0, while if v has at least k assets, then r vd = 1. Hence v d indicates whether our independent set in G has size at least k.
Most representative solution
It could also be reasonable for the authority to look at the entire solution space S, and select a solution that is somehow representative of this space. Assume that we have some distance metric between two vectors, e.g. let us define the distance of r and r ′ as d(r, r ′ ) = v∈B |r v − r ′ v |. There are many natural ways to define a measure of centrality in the solution space; we only discuss two simple methods. One option is to consider the average of all solutions, i.e.r = 1 |S| r∈S r v , and define the centrality of r as cent 1 (r) = d(r,r). Another option is to measure the total distance from all other solutions, i.e. cent 2 (r) = r ′ ∈R d(r, r ′ ). However, given two solutions, we show that is it even hard to decide which of the two is better.
Proof sketch (with details discussed in Appendix A.4). We take the decision version of the MaxIS construction outlined above, and add two more large sets of nodes to our system, as sketched in Figure 14 . The generating group consists of N 2 independent branching gadgets, with a common source node s g . The control group consists of N 3 single nodes, each having a liability of 1 and an incoming debt of 1 from another common node s c . Both s g and s c have 0 external assets, but there is a CDS of weight ∞ from s to both s g and s c , in reference to the negation of v d .
If G has no independent set of size k, then in all solutions, s g and s c (and thus also all nodes in both new groups) are in complete default. On the other hand, if there is an independent set of size at least k, then both s g and s c have infinite assets in this solution. This means that the branching gadgets in the generating group behave as regular branching gadgets, introducing 2 N 2 distinct solutions, and all nodes in the control group have a recovery rate of 1.
Since asymptotically, the control group contains almost all of the nodes, the two cases are very different in terms of solution space. In the first case, the solutions correspond to the 2 N different node sets of G, and control nodes are always in complete default. However, if the system has at least one independent set of size k, then this part of the solution space becomes asymptotically irrelevant, since there are at least 2 N 2 solutions where all control nodes survive. If we define two artificial solutions r and r ′ that have a recovery rate of 0 and 1 for the control nodes, respectively, then cent i (r) < cent i (r ′ ) for either i ∈ {1, 2} if no independent set of size k exists, and cent i (r) > cent i (r ′ ) if there is such an independent set. Thus, deciding cent i (r) ≥ cent i (r ′ ) implies solving the independent set problem efficiently.
One could also study further distance functions or the other variants of this problem. However, our example shows that the solution space can exhibit a threshold behavior between two drastically different shapes, and it is already NP-hard to decide which of two shapes is in fact obtained. This suggests that finding a most representative solution is also hard in any other reasonable formulation of the problem.
Strictly better solutions
Recall that in case of systems with loss, there can also be solutions that are Pareto-suboptimal. In this case, it is also useful to know if a specific solution can be further improved. That is, if there is a solution r ′ that is strictly better then another solution r, then the clearing authority would probably want to implement r ′ instead of r. If such a strictly better solution r ′ was easy to find, then the authority could iteratively improve an initial solution by moving to better and better solutions, until it eventually finds one which is Pareto-optimal. However, deciding if there is a strictly better solution is also NP-hard.
Theorem 18. Given a solution r, it is NP-hard to decide if r is Pareto-suboptimal.
Proof sketch (with details discussed in Appendix A.5). The construction, sketched in Figure 15 , is built around a binary node v 0 . We take our MaxIS decision construction, and to each node v of this construction, we add a so-called unhappy penalty gadget. This essentially means that if r v 0 = 0, then through a CDS, v pays a large penalty to a special sink t 0 . However, t 0 has further gadgets attached to ensure that t 0 is still worse off if r v 0 is in default, even though it gets money from this penalty. Thus, the default of v 0 is not favorable to any node in the system. Note that such a situation is only possible in systems with loss.
The base idea is to add a further node w to the system, which, on the other hand, receives 1 unit if v 0 is in default, and 1 unit if r vd = 1 (i.e., we have an independent set of size k). Let r be the solution where r v 0 = 0 and thus all nodes in the MaxIS construction are in default, but q w = 1. Any solution strictly better than r must also have q w ≥ 1. If v 0 is not in default, this is only possible if the solution finds an independent set of size at least k, thus ensuring r vd = 1.
6 Slightly different models 6 
.1 Financial systems with loss
While our constructions were presented for α = β = 1, our results also hold for any α, β ∈ (0, 1]. Moreover, a different choice of α, β only requires minor modifications to our proofs.
Firstly, note that the choice of α and β only affects the behavior of nodes v that have 0 < r v < 1. Since the majority of our gadgets work with binary nodes, they require no modification for any choice of α, β. The cutoff gadget is also available for any α, β ∈ (0, 1) from the work of [20] . In case of the branching gadget, one can observe that a choice of δ x = 1 β and δ y = 1 provides a similar tool of binary choice for any α, β value.
The remaining parts of the reduction require no changes. The nodes that represent the desired objective function in most of our constructions are either not in default, or in complete default. If such a node is in default due to violating a problem constraint, then having α < 1 or β < 1 only further decreases the clearing rate of the node, and thus makes the solution even more suboptimal.
Bounded edge weights
For simplicity, we often used infinitely large weights in our proof. One can argue that this is not realistic, and edge weights in practical systems are of roughly the same magnitude. With some technical steps, we can also adapt our proofs to systems with bounded edge weights, i.e. if the weight of each contract is within the interval [1, c] for some constant c. This is discussed in detail in Appendix B.1.
The main ideas behind bounded-weight constructions can be summarized as follows:
• Each CDS of weight ∞ can be first replaced by a CDS of weight Θ(N ) only, and then split it into Θ(N ) distinct CDSs of weight 1, from/to Θ(N ) distinct source/sink nodes.
• Our gadgets and logical gates already satisfy the edge constraints, with the exception of and gates on ω(1) inputs. These can be replaced by combinations of not and or gates.
• Using a cutoff gadgets with constant η 1 , η 2 values is not a problem: by scaling up all weights in the system, we can ensure that the gadget's edge weights fall into [1, C 0 ]. In Section 5.6, we also use cutoff gadgets with η i ∈ ( k−1 k , 1); these require some modifications.
Restricted financial systems
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the relations between nodes, the authors of [19, 20] introduce the colored dependency graph. This graph is essentially a transformation of the financial system which removes the ternary relations (i.e. CDSs), and instead models the system as a simple directed graph with edges of two colors. Intuitively, the two colors indicate long and short positions between the specific nodes. The work of [19] shows that if no directed cycle of the dependency graph contains a red edge (i.e. a short position), then the system is guaranteed to have a solution; thus this restricted class of systems might be of particular interest. We point out that our results also hold in this severely restricted class of financial systems. The key observation is that short positions in directed cycles are in fact very rare in our constructions; in particular, this situation only appears within the branching gadget. Hence, if we devise an alternative branching gadget that avoids such a cycle, then this already ensures that our hardness results hold in this restricted model. A detailed discussion of the dependency graph, this restricted model and our alternative branching gadget is available in Appendix B.2.
Appendices A More details on the hardness results

A.1 Construction with different optima for different objective functions
In this section, we describe a simple construction that satisfies the properties outlined in Observation 10. The different parts of the construction are illustrated in Figure 16 .
Creating a system that has exactly 4 solutions is straightforward: we can use 2 branching gadgets that together provide 4 combinations of states. We can then use and gates to create four indicator binary nodes u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 for each of these combinations. In each solution of the system, exactly one of the four nodes u i has r u i = 1.
We then attach four different sets of nodes to the four indicator nodes in order to ensure that each solution has the desired properties.
For the case of u 1 , we add a set W 1 of Θ( √ n) distinct nodes to the system, which all have 0 external assets. From each of these nodes, we create a CDS to t with a weight of 1, in reference to u 1 . Thus if u 1 is chosen, then none of these Θ( √ n) nodes have any liabilities, and they all survive. On the other hand, if we choose any other solution, then these CDSs all incur liabilities, and hence our system has Θ( √ n) nodes in default. Besides W 1 , the system will only have O(1) nodes that can ever go into default, so in the solution where r u 1 = 1, the number of defaulting nodes is only O(1). Thus u 1 is indeed a factor of Ω( √ n) better than any other solution in terms of MinDefault.
To ensure that u 2 is the first preference of Θ(n) nodes, we add a set W 2 of Θ(n) new nodes to the system, all with 0 external assets. We then create a CDS from s to each of these nodes with a weight of 1, in reference to the negation of u 2 . If u 2 is chosen, then these Θ(n) nodes all have an equity of 1; otherwise, their equity is 0. Since the rest of our system will only contain O( √ n)
nodes, this shows that selecting u 1 is the primary preference of the Θ(n) nodes in W 2 , while all other solutions are the primary preference of at most O( √ n) nodes, and thus u 2 is indeed an Ω( √ n)
factor better in terms of MaxPrefer. Finally, we analyze the case of u 3 and u 4 together. For u 3 , we only create one new node w 3 with e w 3 = 0, and add two new CDSs to the system. Both of these CDSs are in reference to u 3 , going to the sink t, and have a weight of h 2 ; one of them comes from w 3 , the other comes from s. For u 4 , we add a single node w 4 with e w 4 = 0 again, and we create two new CDSs going to t. The first CDS comes from w 4 , has a weight of h, and is in reference to u 4 . The second CDS comes from s, has a weight of h 3 , and is in reference to the negated version of u 4 .
This means that if any solution other than u 3 is chosen, then we introduce h 2 paid and h 2 unpaid liabilities into the system. Similarly, if u 4 is chosen, then h 3 paid liabilities are introduced, but if u 4 is not chosen, then h unpaid liabilities are introduced. In contrast to this, the CDSs based on u 1 and u 2 only result in O(n) paid or unpaid liabilities, so since we assume h = ω(n), the total amount of liabilities is always determined by the CDSs of u 3 and u 4 .
Let us analyze the total amount of paid and unpaid liabilities in all four solutions. If u 1 or u 2 is chosen, then the CDSs of u 3 ensure that there is a Θ(h 2 ) amount of both paid and unpaid liabilities in the system. If u 3 is chosen, then the amount of unpaid liabilities is only Θ(h), while the amount of paid liabilities is O(n). Finally, if u 4 is chosen, the amount of unpaid liabilities is Θ(h 2 ), while the total amount of paid liabilities is Θ(h 3 ).
This shows that u 3 and u 4 indeed fulfill our requirements. The total amount of unpaid liabilities is Θ(h) in u 3 , and Θ(h 2 ) in all other solutions, which is indeed a difference of a factor Ω(h) in terms of MinUnpaid. The rate of unpaid to total liabilities is a constant in u 1 and u 2 , and asymptotically We note that this system illustrates all 4 objective functions in one example, creating large gaps between every pair of solutions. As such, it requires the very large edge weights described above to allow a straightforward analysis. Therefore, this example does not generalize to the bounded-weight case in a trivial way.
To show that the optima for any two objective functions can also differ significantly in the bounded-weight case, it is easier to provide 4 2 separate examples. I.e. for each specific pair of objective functions, we can define a separate system with exactly two solutions, such that both are the optimum for one of the two objective functions, and both functions are a Θ( √ n) factor better in the optimum than in the other solution. Using the same ideas as in the construction above, one can indeed construct all of 6 these example systems with bounded edge weights.
A.2 Reductions for the objective functions in Section 5.4
In this section, we discuss how slightly modified variants of the constructions in Theorems 11 and 12 can be used to similarly prove the claims of Theorems 13, 14 and 15. In fact, for the proof of Theorem 13, we do not even need to modify the original construction.
Proof of Theorem 13. Consider the construction of Theorem 12. Whenever a new node u z,i is in default, it has q u z,i = 0, while it has q u z,i = 1 if it survives. Thus, the number of nodes u z,i preferring a given solution is exactly the number of nodes u z,i surviving in the solution. Recall that there are only O(N 2 ) other nodes besides the u z,i , so these are still asymptotically irrelevant. Hence approximating MaxPrefer is equivalent to approximating MaxSurviving in the construction, so we can apply the proof of Theorem 12 without any changes. We could also introduce the dual problem MinLeastPrefer of selecting the solution which is the last preference of the smallest possible number of nodes, i.e. define q v (min) = min r∈S q v (r) and use |{v ∈ B | q v (r) = q v (min) }| as the objection function to minimize. Then MinLeastPrefer problem can then be reduced to MinDefault in an identical way.
Proof of Theorem 14. Consider the construction of Theorem 11 again. Each activated branching gadget results in the default of the corresponding N 3 new nodes, each of which cause an unpaid liability of exactly 1. Thus for an independent dominating set of size k, the amount of unpaid debt is k · N 3 (asymptotically). Hence an approximation for MinUnpaid also provides an approximation for MinIDS.
Note that any solution has an unpaid liability of at least N 3 , either because it has at least one active branching gadget (pushing the corresponding u z,i into default), or because it corresponds to the empty set and thus violates the domination constraint (pushing all u z,i into default). On the other hand, the total amount of liabilities in original MinIDS construction (without the nodes u z,i ) is in O(N 2 ), so we can ignore this part of the system again.
Again, we can similarly define MaxPaid as the problem of maximizing v∈B p v . To obtain a construction for this problem, we again start with a MaxIS construction, similarly to the case of MaxSurviving. However, we now obtain v z as the or relation of the node y in the corresponding branching gadget, and the negation of v c . Thus if a node z is in the chosen set, then the corresponding nodes u z,i all pay 1 unit of money to the sink due to the CDS. However, if any problem constraint is violated, then none of the CDSs are present, and thus none of the new nodes pay any debt at all. With this, the amount of debt paid is again proportional to the number of nodes in the independent set.
Finally, we consider the problem of minimizing the proportion of unpaid liabilities, or the dual problem of maximizing the proportion of paid liabilities.
Proof of Theorem 15. Consider the base MinIDS construction, and let us add to this construction the new nodes of both Theorem 11 and Theorem 12 with a slight modification. That is, for every branching gadget, we add two new nodes v z and v ′ z , where v z expresses the or relation of the neagtion of v c and the activation of the branching gadget, while v ′ z expresses the or relation of the negation of v c and the non-activation of the branching gadget. We then add two new sets of N 3 nodes u z,i and u ′ z,i , each with a CDS of weight 2 to the sink as before. The CDSs from nodes u z,i are with reference to v z , while the CDSs from u ′ z,i are with reference to v ′ z . While the nodes u ′ z,i each have 1 external asset as before, the nodes u z,i have 2 external assets each. I.e. if a specific CDS becomes a liability, then a node u z,i has enough assets to pay for it, but a node u ′ z,i is sent into default.
This means that regardless of whether the branching gadget of z is active or not, exactly N 3 of the corresponding CDSs turn into actual liabilities (assuming that the constraints are satisfied): either those from the nodes u z,i or those from u ′ z,i . Hence in every valid solution, the total amount of liabilities is 2 · N · N 3 (plus a negligible O(N 2 ) term). The amount of unpaid liabilities is again k · N 3 , with k denoting the size of the independent dominating set. Thus the proportion of unpaid liabilities in any solution is essentially k 2·N , which is proportional to k. Approximating MinPropUnpaid would also imply an approximation for MinIDS in this case.
On the other hand, if a constraint is violated, then none of these CDSs incur liabilities, so none of the new nodes generate any debt. Instead, we add a distinct set of N 4 new penalty nodes for this case, all with 0 external assets, and an outgoing CDS of weight 1 in reference to v c . This ensures that if a constraint is violated, then the system will have N 4 unpaid debts (besides a negligible paid debt of at most O(N 2 )), and thus the proportion of unpaid debts will be 1 asymptotically.
Compared to this, the case of MaxPropPaid only requires a minimal modification. Since we have a maximization problem, we need to switch the underlying construction to MaxIS. We again add two new indicators v z and v ′ z and both sets of nodes u z,i and u ′ z,i for each branching gadget. However, we now give 0 external assets to the nodes u z,i and 1 external assets to the nodes u ′ z,i , so that each node z contained in the independent set now generates a paid liability of 1, and the nodes not contained in the set do not generate any paid liabilities. This way, the total amount of liabilities is still 2 · N 4 in every solution that satisfies the constraints, and the amount of paid liabilities is k ·N 3 for an independent set of size k, resulting in a fraction k 2·N of paid liabilities. This is again proportional to k, so the reduction to MaxIS follows. For the case of constraint violations, we apply the same method as in case of MinPropUnpaid.
Note that in the constructions of Theorems 11-15, if any of the constraints is violated, then we get an unreasonably bad solution, and a trivial subset of nodes already provides a better solution than this. In particular, in case of maximization problems, any one-node subset of G (having N 3 of the new nodes surviving) gives a better solution than the one violating the constraints. In case of minimization problems, any maximal independent set in G has at most N − 1 nodes (unless we have the trivial case of an empty graph), implying that at least N 3 of the new nodes survive; this also ensures a better solution in each case. Hence these trivial node sets are always better than any solution that violates the constraints. If an approximation algorithm were to return a solution violating constraints, we can simply replace it with such a trivial node set.
We also briefly reflect on the fact that we can ignore the lower-order O(N 2 ) terms in the objective functions throughout the reductions. Recall that in case of the MaxEquity reduction, the value of a MaxEquity solution and the corresponding MaxIS solution was exactly the same. However, for the reductions in this chapter, e.g. for MinDefault, they differ in a O(N 2 ) term for both the optimum and our chosen solution.
However, as discussed, the value of the objective function is in Θ(N 3 ) for any reasonable solution. This means that for N large enough, we can overestimate the value of a MinDefault solution by removing the O(N 2 ) term and multiplying the Θ(N 3 ) term by a constant factor (say, 2) instead, and we can underestimate the optimum cost by simply removing the O(N 2 ) term in it. This way, the approximation ratio of the MinDefault solution will differ by at most a factor of 2 from the approximation ratio of the resulting MinIDS solution. Note that such a constant factor has no effect on our reductions: a c · N 1−ǫ approximation (for some constant c) is also not possible for MinIDS, since this is still asymptotically smaller than N 1−ǫ ′ with some ǫ ′ < ǫ.
A.3 Balanced solution for alliances covering the whole system
We now show that the most balanced partition (minimizing
We first consider α = β = 1.
For this, let us begin with the construction presented in the proof of Theorem 16. Consider the construction modeling the MinIDS problem, and let us denote the total amount of external assets in this construction by e M inIDS . We assign each node in this construction to alliance V 1 . Furthermore, we also assign v 1 to V 1 , and we assign v 2 to V 2 . Since v 1 ∈ V 1 and v 2 ∈ V 2 , this will again ensure that any solution which violates a constraint (and thus introduces a penalty of N from v 1 to v 2 ) is unreasonably bad. Furthermore, assuming that each branching gadget has its own source and sink node, the general source and sink nodes s and t and not connected to any other node in this specific construction; let us assign s to V 1 and t to V 2 .
Recall from the proof of Observation 4 that in systems without loss, the total amount of equity is fixed over all solutions. Since none of the nodes in V 1 \ {v 1 } have any outgoing edge to V 2 ∪ {v 1 }, the same is true for the subsystem V 1 \ {v 1 }. Hence if for some large integer h, we select e s = h and e t = h + e M inIDS , then regardless of our choices in the MinIDS construction, the total equity of V 1 \ {v 1 } and t will be the same (as long as the constraints are satisfied). Thus the difference of equity between the two alliances will be exactly q v 2 − q v 1 as in our original construction, which is proportional to the size of the chosen set.
The same analysis is slightly more difficult if α < 1 or β < 1. In this case, we also need to remove each and gate in the construction, and express the same and condition with a combination of not and or gates instead. Note that our not and or gates only comprise of binary nodes, and the behavior of a binary node is the same for any α, β. In particular, this means that funds are never lost at binary nodes for any α, β value, and thus Observation 4 also holds for subsystems that comprise only of binary nodes. Hence after the transformation, the sum of the equity in V 1 \ {v 1 } becomes fixed as before, and we can apply the same reasoning as in the case of lossless systems.
A.4 Most representative solution
We now discuss the proof of Theorem 17 in more detail. For simplicity, we assume k ≥ 2 (otherwise, the independent set decision problem becomes trivial). As mentioned before, the base of this proof is the decision version of our MaxIS construction, and the addition of two large sets of nodes to it: the generating group and the control group.
The generating group consists of N 2 distinct branching gadgets, with source nodes of these branching gadgets replaced by a common new node s g . On the other hand, the control group consists of N 3 distinct nodes, each having 0 external assets, a simple debt of weight 1 towards t, and an incoming dept payment of weight 1 from a new common node s c . The nodes s g and s c have no external assets, but we add a CDS of weight ∞ from the source s to both s g and s c , in reference to a node v D which is obtained as the negated version of v d .
In any solution that does not correspond to an independent set of size at least k (and thus has r vd = 0), the nodes s g and s c are both in complete default. In the generating group, this implies that none of the branching gadgets have any assets, and thus all nodes in these gadgets are in complete default; assuming r vd = 0, this is the only subsolution of this subsystem. In the control group, this means that none of the N 3 control nodes can pay their debt to the sink, and thus they are in complete default, too.
However, if there exists an independent set of size at least k, then in the corresponding solution, both s g and s c have infinitely many assets. Hence each branching gadget in the generating group indeed offers a binary choice, thus introducing 2 N 2 distinct solutions for each independent set of size at least k in G. In all of these solutions, all nodes in the control group have a recovery rate of 1. This means that if G has no independent set of size at least k, then there are only 2 N different solutions (each corresponding to a node set of G), and control nodes are always in complete default. On the other hand, if there is at least one independent set of sufficient size, then there are still at most 2 N solutions with control nodes in complete default (corresponding to node sets that are not independent or have size at most k − 1), but in addition to this, there are at least 2 N 2 solutions that are induced by an independent set of size at least k, and in these solutions, the control nodes all have a recovery rate of 1. In this latter case, the solutions where the control nodes are in default are asymptotically irrelevant, since their cardinality is much smaller.
It only remains to define two artificial solutions r and r ′ , such that the recovery rate of control nodes is 0 and 1 in these solutions, respectively. Let us add an and gate to the MaxIS construction which checks whether our current solution corresponds to the empty set; i.e. we create an and gate on N inputs which are connected to the lower nodes y of each of the N branching gadgets. We then negate the output of this and gate in a node v ∅ , and add a further CDS with weight ∞ from s to s c , with reference to this node v ∅ , as shown in Figure 17 . This makes the empty set solution artificially special: in case of this solution, s c receives infinite assets through this new CDS, and thus each control node has a recovery rate of 1. Note that this is only 1 solution of the system, which is asymptotically irrelevant to both 2 N and 2 N 2 , so this has no major effect on the solution space in either case (i.e. regardless of whether the graph has an independent set of size k).
The solution r ′ is significantly easier to define: we can just select any arbitrary 1-node independent set, i.e. any solution that has exactly one active branching gadget. Since k ≥ 2, this still ensures r vd = 0, and thus all control nodes are in complete default in any such solution.
This financial system design and choice of r, r ′ completes our reduction. Since the vast majority of nodes in the system are control nodes, both metrics of centrality are defined exclusively by the control nodes in an asymptotic sense. If there is no independent set of size k, then almost all solutions have each control node in complete default, and thus r ′ is better according to both definitions of centrality: it has lower total distance from other solutions (since they agree on the recovery rate of control nodes), and also a lower distance from the average (in which the control nodes are in 'almost' complete default). However, if there is an independent set of size k, then r is the better vector in terms of centrality, since the majority of solutions (and thus asymptotically the average) has a recovery rate of 1 for the control nodes.
Hence, by efficiently deciding whether r or r ′ is more central, we could also decide if there is an independent set of size k in G, and thus our hardness result follows.
A.5 Finding a strictly better solution
As discussed before, the construction of Theorem 18 applies the decision version of our MaxIS construction. Note that this construction still works if we have α = 1 or β = 1 (see Section 6.1 for details).
A main ingredient for the proof is the unhappy penalty gadget shown in Figure 18 . Assume that there is a node v in the system, and we want to add an outgoing penalty of some large weight h to v, conditioned on the default of an indicator binary node v 0 . If this task was executed by simply adding a CDS from v to the sink t, then the solutions where v 0 is in default would not be strictly worse for every node in this subsystem, since t would obtain a higher equity due to the received penalty payment. In contrast to this, the unhappy penalty gadget ensures that the default of v 0 does provides a smaller-or-equal equity for each of the nodes.
Consider any parameters α, β < 1, and in terms of α and h, let us define a new parameter b = h+5 1−α . The design of the unhappy penalty gadget requires us to add a CDS of weight h towards a designated 'semi-sink' node t 0 , which has external assets of 1. However, we also add two further nodes u and t ′ 0 to the gadget. Node u has b + 1 external assets, a simple debt of weight b to t 0 , and an outgoing CDS of weight 2 to t ′ 0 , also in reference to v 0 . Finally, t 0 has a simple debt of b towards the sink node t ′ 0 (for a simpler analysis, we assume that t ′ 0 is not a general common sink in the system, but a distinct sink node specifically created for v; this does not affect our hardness result).
In this subsystem, if v 0 is not in default, then u has no liability towards t ′ 0 , and thus it is not in default; it pays its debt to t 0 and has an equity of 1. Receiving this amount allows t 0 to pay its debt, thus also having an equity of 1. As a result, the sink t ′ 0 receives a sum of b in incoming payments from t 0 .
On the other hand, if v 0 is in complete default, then u has a total of b + 2 liabilities, pushing it into default; thus, it can only use α·(b+1) from its external assets, paying b b+2 ·α·(b+1) < α·(b+1) ∞ s s c y y Figure 18 : The unhappy penalty gadget to node t 0 and 2 b+2 · α · (b + 1) < 2 to node t ′ 0 . Even together with the sum of (at most) h received from node v as a penalty, this only gives total assets of less than h + 1 + α · (b + 1) for t 0 . Note that our choice of b ensures that h
Thus node t 0 also cannot pay its liabilities in this case, and hence it is sent into default. This means that the sink t ′ 0 receives a payment of strictly less than h + 1 + α · (b + 1) from t 0 , and together with the payment of strictly less then 2 received from u, it has a total assets (and equity) of strictly less than b. This is again ensured by our choice of b: the fact that b > h+4 1−α implies
Hence, t ′ 0 receives a total payment of strictly less than b from the subsystem in this case. Therefore, this latter solution is strictly worse for the subsystem: v's equity is decreased due to the extra penalty of weight h, the nodes v 0 , u and t 0 have an equity of 0 now, and the equity of t ′ 0 is also smaller due to the smaller amount of incoming payments. This completes the description of the unhappy penalty gadget.
Given the unhappy penalty gadget, we now describe the remaining details of the construction outlined in Section 5.6.2. To avoid discussing infinite equities, we introduce a separate source node s 0 into this construction with e s 0 = 2 only, and provide the incoming CDSs for node w from this node.
As shown in Figure 15 , our construction is based on a pair of nodes v 0 and v ′ 0 with no external assets and a debt of 1 to each other. Clearly the vectors (0, 0) and (1, 1) are solutions to this subsystem. In any other solution, both v 0 and v ′ 0 have to be in default, and thus any such other solution must satisfy r v 0 = β · r v ′ 0 and r v ′ 0 = β · r v 0 . For any β < 1 parameter, this only yields the solution (0, 0) again. Thus v 0 is indeed a binary node, and the subsystem acts as a different kind of branching gadget for the case of systems with loss.
Our construction for Theorem 18, sketched in Figure 15 of Section 5.6.2, uses the decision version of the MaxIS construction, and then through unhappy penalty gadgets, it adds an arbitrarily large penalty to each node in the MaxIS construction with reference to v 0 . Furthermore, we take the indicator node v d of the decision problem, and create a negated version v d of it, which also receives such an infinite penalty gadget with reference to v 0 . Finally, we have w and s 0 in the construction, with e w = 0 and e s 0 = 2. We add two distinct CDSs of weight 1 from s 0 to w, one of them with reference to v 0 , the other with reference to v d .
In our reduction, the parameter solution r is the one where r v 0 = r v ′ 0 = 0, thus each node of the MaxIS construction is in default (with an equity of 0), and the nodes in the unhappy penalty gadgets are also not in a favorable state. Node s 0 has an equity of 1 in this solution. More importantly, node w also has an equity of 1, and thus any solution that is strictly better than r must also have q w ≥ 1. Note that if r v 0 = r v ′ 0 = 0 is fixed, then this is the only solution of the system.
Thus in any other solution, we must have r v 0 = r v ′ 0 = 1. However, this implies that w does not receive any payment through the CDS in reference to v 0 . Hence a strictly better solution can only exists if it has r v d = 0 and thus r vd = 1, i.e. if we find an independent set of size at least k in the corresponding graph. Any such set indeed provides a strictly better solution: the nodes in the MaxIS construction cannot have an equity less than 0, and the nodes in the unhappy penalty gadgets have strictly larger equities. Nodes v 0 , v ′ 0 still have an equity of 0, and nodes s 0 and w still have an equity of 1. Thus a strictly better solution than r exists if and only if there is an independent set of size at least k in G, and thus deciding its existence is indeed NP-hard.
B Detailed discussion of the model variants B.1 Bounded edge weights
Each construction in our inapproximability proofs can be adapted to the bounded edge weight model using the main ideas outlined in Section 6.2.
Replacing the ∞ weights in our constructions is rather straightforward. As a first step, we can replace each of these weights of ∞ by weights of Θ(N ), while still ensuring that violating the given constraint produces a solution with smaller value than that of any solution satisfying the constraints. Then for each such incoming (or outgoing) CDS of weight Θ(N ), we can split the CDS to Θ(N ) distinct CDSs of weight 1, coming from (or going to) Θ(N ) separate source (or sink) nodes. The technique only requires the addition of at most Θ(N ) new source/sink nodes, which has no effect on our results asymptotically.
If edge weights are restricted to constants, another problem arises when we apply and gates on a non-constant number of nodes, since this requires a cutoff gadget with non-constant parameters. For each such and gate, we can simply negate all the input nodes, combine them with an or gate, and then negate the output to obtain the same relation.
However, we cannot entirely avoid cutoff gadgets with non-constant parameters, since they do not exclusively appear in and gates. When checking if the chosen set has size at least k in the decision problems (in Section 5.6), the use of a cutoff gadgets with η 1 , η 2 between k−1 k and 1 is still necessary. This would produce edge weights of Θ(k) after scaling up the weights.
Hence we also describe an alternative cutoff gadget variant that provides this functionality while containing only constant edge weights. This gadget is shown in Figure 19 . Given our node v that indicates the size of the chosen set, we add k outgoing debts of 1 towards k distinct sink nodes. We can then create an indicator node u which has a total of k input CDSs in reference to v (split between various source nodes), and an output debt of 1. If our chosen set has size at least k, then v is not in default, and thus u is in complete default (r u = 0). However, if the set has size less than k, then r v ≤ k−1 k , and thus u has assets of at least 1 k · k = 1. In this case, u is not in default (r u = 1). Thus, negating u provides a cutoff gadget with η 1 , η 2 ∈ ( k−1 k , 1), while only using O(k) edges of constant weight.
Finally, there are some special cases in our constructions where we discuss the constant-weight transformation separately.
In case of the construction of Theorem 17, the CDSs from s to s g and s c provide assets to Θ(N 2 ) and Θ(N 3 ) nodes, respectively, and thus they need to be split to Θ(N 2 ) and Θ(N 3 ) different CDS of weight 1 (from Θ(N 3 ) distinct source nodes). However, adding Θ(N 3 ) new source nodes to the graph is not a problem, since these new source nodes have a recovery rate of 1 in every solution, and thus they do not affect the centrality of any solution.
For the construction in the proof of Theorem 16, we also have to execute a minor modification, since splitting the penalty CDS of weight N would result in N different CDSs from v 1 to v 2 , all in reference to the same node v c . Instead, we replace the penalty CDS by adding N distinct CDSs from N distinct source nodes to v 2 , all of them with weight 1 and in reference to v c . Similarly, we add N distinct CDSs from v 1 to N distinct sink nodes, all of weight 1 and in reference to v c . The resulting system provides the same behavior for nodes v 1 and v 2 as the original system.
The unhappy penalty gadget in the construction of Section 5.6.2 does not require significant modifications either. As outlined before, we can split the penalty CDSs into distinct CDSs of constant size, providing a constant parameter h for the unhappy penalty gadget. With h and α both being constants, the edge weights required by the gadget are also all within a constant range.
We again point out that the construction in Appendix A.1 does not generalize to the constantweight case in a straightforward way. Instead, showing that the objective functions can have very different optima is simpler on separate examples for each pair of functions.
B.2 Without red-containing cycles
We now discuss the details of adapting our constructions to the restricted case when financial systems are not allowed to have so-called red-containing cycles.
The colored dependency graph was developed by [19, 20] to gain a deeper understanding of the Figure 20 : Illustration of the transformation into the dependency graph, in line with [19] . Green arrows (with filled arrowheads) express long positions, while red arrows (with empty arrowheads) express short positions. behavior of the system. The dependency graph is a directed graph with edges of two colors: green and red. Intuitively, a green edge from u to v means a long position, i.e. that it is better for v if u has a larger recovery rate. On the other hand, a red edge from u to v means a short position, i.e. that a smaller recovery rate at u is more beneficial to v. We now outline the formal definition for the colored dependency graph; for more details on this, we refer the reader to [19] .
The dependency graph has the same node set as the original financial system. The edges of the dependency graph are then formed according to the following rules:
• If there is a debt or CDS from u to v in the system, then we draw a green edge from u to v.
• If there is a CDS from u with reference to w in the system, then we draw a green edge from w to u.
• If there is a CDS from u to v of weight δ 0 with reference to w, and w does not have a debt of weight at least δ 0 to v in the system, then we draw a red edge from w to v.
An illustration of these rules, originally from [19] , is visible in Figure 20 . The rule set provides a simple directed graph with two-colored edges. Based on the dependency graph, the work of [19] discusses three restricted classes of financial systems that always guarantee the existence of a solution. In the most restricted variant, the dependency graph is required to be acyclic; such a system is guaranteed to have a unique solution [19] . In the second variant, red edges can only go to so-called leaf nodes that have no outgoing edges; such systems always have a solution that is optimal for all non-leaf nodes, and this solution can easily be found by iterating an update function [19] . Therefore, the study of the solution space in these models is not particularly interesting to us, since it is trivialized by the heavy restrictions.
However, the third variant only requires that no directed cycle in the dependency graph contains a red edge. This model already ensures the existence of a solution [19] , while still allowing reasonably rich behavior. We show that our hardness results already apply in this restricted model.
For the general intuition behind this restricted model, consider the strongly connected components of the dependency graph. Within each such component, we only have green edges, which ensures that if the recovery rate outside this component is fixed, then there exists a maximal solution within this component. Given arbitrary topological ordering of the components, every component is only affected by the preceding components in the ordering. Therefore, we can iterate through the components in this order, and always select the maximal solution in the current component, considering the chosen recovery rates of the preceding components to be already fixed. However, while this ensures the existence of a solution, it does not trivialize the problem of selecting the best solution according to a specific objective function. This method only provides the solution which contains the maximal subsolution in the first component. However, selecting a different (non-maximal) subsolution in the first component can allow us to end up with a different subsolution in the second component, which may be much more optimal in terms of the objective function if the second component is larger or more influential in some other way.
To adapt our constructions to the case of systems without red-containing cycles, the key observation is that in fact, directed cycles are very rare in the dependency graphs of our constructions. We mostly use logical gates and cutoff gadgets that follow a clear logical ordering, a formula that we are expressing, thus the dependency graphs of our constructions are already very close to DAGs. The only exceptions to this are branching gadgets, where x and y both have a CDS with reference to each other, and hence there is a red edge between them in both directions. Indeed, in any branching gadget, x and y clearly have a short position on each other. Therefore, the dependency graph has a cycle of red edges (from x to y to x) at each of our branching gadgets.
Thus we only need to devise a new branching gadget that executes the same functionality (i.e. represents a binary choice) without a red-containing cycle, and then our reductions already carry over to this restricted model. Our modified branching gadget is shown in Figure 21 . The gadget is based on two nodes v 0 and v ′ 0 , which both have 0 external assets, a debt of 1 to each other, and are not affected by anything else besides this (they have no further incoming/outgoing debts and no external assets). The solutions of this subsystem are exactly the clearing vectors with r v 0 = r v ′ 0 = ρ for some ρ ∈ [0, 1]. The key idea behind our approach is to ensure that in any reasonable solution, this subsystem obtains either a very small or a very large ρ value; then the value of ρ being small or large indicates the binary choice (e.g. containment in an independent set) which was previously represented by our branching gadgets.
We ensure that in every reasonable solution, we have either ρ ≤ 1 3 or ρ ≥ 2 3 in this branching gadget. To achieve this, we append two cutoff gadgets to v 0 , one with parameters η 1 = 1 6 and η 2 = 1 3 , and the other with η 1 = 2 3 and η 2 = 5 6 . Let the output nodes of these cutoff gadgets be denoted by w 1 and w 2 , respectively. We then encode the condition w 1 and (not w 2 ) through logical gates, and if this condition holds, we introduce an infinitely large penalty to our objective function in the construction (similarly to our previous constraints). This already ensures that we cannot have ρ ∈ [ 1 3 , 2 3 ] in any reasonable solution. Finally, we add two further cutoff gadgets to node v 0 , with parameters η 1 = 1 3 , η 2 = 1 2 and parameters η 1 = 1 2 , η 2 = 2 3 . If we denote the output of the first gadget by x, and the negation of the output of the second gadget by y, then we can use x and y to represent a binary choice in an identical way to our original branching gadget. The two cutoff gadgets ensure that if ρ ≤ 1 3 , then r x = 1 and r y = 0, and if ρ ≥ 2 3 , then r x = 0 and r y = 1. Since our large penalty excludes any ρ ∈ ( 1 3 , 2 3 ), this ensures that in any reasonable solution, we have either r x = 0 and r y = 1 or r x = 1 and r y = 0. Thus by replacing each original branching gadget with this tool, we can use our original constructions to show the same results in this restricted model.
Note that when ρ ∈ ( 1 6 , 1 3 ) or ρ ∈ ( 2 3 , 5 6 ), then the cutoff gadgets do not ensure that w 1 and w 2 are binary nodes, and thus in contrast to our previous constructions, the and gate might also not provide a binary node. This means that in case of this alternative branching gadget, some fraction of the penalty might already apply when ρ ∈ ( 1 6 , 1 3 ) or ρ ∈ ( 2 3 , 5 6 ). However, any such solution can be improved by selecting ρ ≤ 1 6 or ρ ≥ 5 6 instead, respectively. Thus, reasonable solutions will in fact always have ρ / ∈ ( 1 6 , 5 6 ). Nonetheless, the binary properties of nodes x and y are already guaranteed when ρ / ∈ [ 1 3 , 2 3 ]. Also note that this alternative branching gadget becomes significantly simpler for the case of β < 1. In this case, the only valid solutions to the subsystem consisting of v 0 and v ′ 0 are (0, 0) and (1, 1) . Thus v 0 itself can already represent the binary choice, and attaching the cutoff gadgets becomes unnecessary. When defining the model, the work of Schuldenzucker et. al. also applies two so-called sanity assumptions to exclude degenerate financial systems. We explicitly mentioned the first such assumption in our model description section (namely, the fact that no node enters into a contract with itself or in reference to itself). However, we have omitted the second assumption for the sake of simplicity. Since CDSs are usually understood as an insurance policy on debt, this second assumption requires that if any CDSs are made in reference to a node w, then w must have at least one outgoing simple debt contract of positive weight. The work of [19] uses this assumption in the fixed-point theorem proof to show that every lossless financial system has at least one solution. We did not mention this assumption because it is irrelevant for our results; more specifically, each of our constructions satisfy the assumption, a thus this extra restriction does not affect the validity of our results.
C Further discussion of the model
Furthermore, we also note that the work of Schuldenzucker et. al. shows that even if all contracts in a financial system have rational (or integer) weights, the system can still have solutions where the recovery rates are irrational [19] . In this case, even finding a representation of a solution is problematic. This is also the reason why we expressed Theorem 18 in terms of NP-hardness, and not NP-completeness: the containment in NP is not straightforward, since the strictly better solution might not be a trivial witness of this property due to these representation issues. However, we point out that this is not the source of the computational hardness in our results: in each of our constructions, every solution consists of rational recovery rates, and even integers (i.e. 0 or 1) in most cases.
